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Abstract
This article deals with the relationship between humanitarian law and hu-
man rights. Our argument is that the emergence of  human rights as a parti-
cular language of  political transformation in the 1970s had a crucial impact 
on traditional readings of  international humanitarian law. On one hand, the 
breakthrough of  rights language created favorable conditions for humani-
tarian norms to reclaim its relevance in law and politics nowadays. On the 
other, it obliged humanitarian norms to share space in the legal imaginary 
with the novel language of  social emancipation of  rights. We examine how 
the construction of  legal arguments within a rights vocabulary may blur 
legal definitions and create space for abuses. Finally, we analyse specific si-
tuations where human rights law facilitates the state to use its powers in spite 
of  humanitarian norms.
Keywords: Humanitarian Law. Human Rights Law. International Criminal 
Law.
Resumo 
Este artigo trata da relação entre direito humanitário e direitos humanos. 
Nosso argumento é que o surgimento dos direitos humanos como uma lin-
guagem específica de transformação política na década de 1970 teve um im-
pacto crucial nas leituras tradicionais do direito internacional humanitário. 
De um lado, o avanço da linguagem dos direitos humanos criou condições 
favoráveis para que as normas humanitárias recuperassem sua relevância no 
direito e na política atualmente. Por outro, obrigou as normas humanitárias 
a dividirem espaço no imaginário jurídico com a nova linguagem da eman-
cipação social dos direitos. Analisamos como a construção de argumentos 
legais dentro de um vocabulário de direitos pode obscurecer as definições 
legais e criar espaço para abusos. Finalmente, analisamos situações específi-
cas em que a lei de direitos humanos facilita o estado a usar seus poderes, 
apesar das normas humanitárias.
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1 Introduction
The most violent conflict between Latin American 
countries in the 19th century, the Paraguayan War or Tri-
ple Alliance War (1864-1870), defined the fate of  the 
Southern Cone. In Brazil, it fostered the decline of  the 
monarchy and the rise of  the military into politics. In 
Argentina and Uruguay, the war consolidated the na-
tion-state and its local elites. The consequences were 
dreadful for all, but undoubtedly Paraguay suffered the 
most: not only its economy and institutions were des-
troyed, but its population shrank considerably.1 There is 
little evidence on the role of  law in such conflict, specifi-
cally if  the belligerents followed any norms conducting 
the hostilities. Surely legal arguments were around in a 
time when lawyers were amongst the decision-makers: 
the Brazilian historian Francisco Doratioto describes 
how norms and punishments were used to guarantee 
discipline and order amongst the troops, and how cri-
mes such as desertions were treated during the hostili-
ties. In his narrative, reports of  torture, ill treatment and 
attacks on civilians are along with some principles such 
as reciprocity regarding the treatment of  prisoners of  
war.2 Nonetheless, a detailed appraisal of  international 
law and the Paraguayan War is yet to be written.
In 1867 – thus, during the Paraguayan War – Anto-
nio de Vasconcellos Menezes de Drummond (1819-1876) 
published one of  the first international law textbooks in 
Brazil intended to educate its burgeoning state bureau-
cracy and political elite. He dedicated few words to the 
Paraguayan War, usually with a nationalist tone against the 
‘Paraguayan dictator’. Regarding the new methods of  war-
fare, he welcomed the gunpowder and long-distance arti-
llery that “gave war a less barbaric physiognomy”.3 With 
1 The traditional historiography count that its population shrink 
by nearly 70 percent, (e.g., WHIGHAM, Thomas. The paraguayan 
war: causes and early conduct. 2. ed. Calgary: University of  Calgary 
Press, 2018.), although more detailed studies show that such num-
bers are disputed (e.g., DORATIOTO, Francisco. Maldita guerra: 
nova história da Guerra do Paraguai. 2. ed. São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras, 2002.)
2 According to Doratioto, in 1869 there were 2.458 Paraguayans 
prisoners of  war in Brazil. Some of  them were children who re-
ceived a formal education. A similar treatment was given to Brazil-
ian prisoners in Paraguay. (DORATIOTO, Francisco. Maldita guerra: 
nova história da Guerra do Paraguai. 2. ed. São Paulo: Companhia 
das Letras, 2002.).
3 “A invenção da polvora, a introducção das novas armas, que per-
mittem levar longe a morte, as sábias complicações da arte militar 
modema, que são os meios de paralysar as forças do inimigo, inuti-
lisar as suas munições e pô-los fóra de combate, deram à guerra uma 
no further clarifications or examples, he states that Brazil 
followed the humanitarian principles during the hostilities. 
His account of  the war of  his time adds little to its histo-
riography, but his thoughts on the general relation of  law 
and war shed some light on his legal thinking. For him, 
war is a natural phenomenon, an “inevitable evil”, but one 
which has its own rules. He understands the laws of  war 
both as the “restrictions established between civilised na-
tions” during war and the “necessary means to its end”. 
Law regulates war by placing ‘restrictions’, and also by 
allowing ‘means’ – a common construction as we will see. 
Even though such norms come from agreements from 
‘civilised nations’, the “true regulator of  war is Christian 
morality and modern civilisation – so that no acts of  bar-
barity are perpetrated”.4
There are many concurrent historiographies dedica-
ted to the rules applied in times of  war. An orthodox 
perspective traces thin lines connecting current huma-
nitarian law to ancient customs and practices. To a com-
mentator, rules regarding the conduct of  warfare “have 
existed since most ancient times in all civilizations”, such 
as ancient China, Black Africa, Pre-Colombian Ameri-
ca and even rules mentioned in the Old Testament.5 
Others point to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as 
the time when rules, principles and practices regarding 
warfare received its current design. Drummond’s ac-
count of  law and war would be an example of  this legal 
thinking. In this article, we are more interested in this 
later understanding. More specifically, we analyse the re-
lation of  the legal reasoning on warfare that arose in the 
20th century and its relation to another influential legal 
idea, that of  human rights. To an influential jurist, “the 
phrase ‘international humanitarian law’ has increasingly 
supplanted terms such as the ‘law of  war’ and the ‘law 
physionomia menos barbara” (DRUMMOND, Antonio de Vascon-
cellos Menezes de. Prelecções de direito internacional: com referencia e 
applicação de seus princípios a’s leis particulares do brasil até 1867. 
Recife: Typographia do Correio do Recife, 1867.).
4 “o verdadeiro regulador da guerra é a moral christãa e a civi-
lisação moderna – para não perpetrarem-se actos de barbaria. A lei 
da guerra – consiste pois no complexo das restricções eslabelecidas 
entre as Nações civilisadas para n’ella empregar-se sómente os meios 
necessarios ao seu fim, e não actos de barbaridade, muitas vezes 
inuteis, injustos e immoraes ou contrarios à lei natural. A guerra é um mal 
inevitavel; tem suas leis como a paz” (DRUMMOND, Antonio de 
Vasconcellos Menezes de. Prelecções de direito internacional: com refer-
encia e applicação de seus princípios a’s leis particulares do brasil até 
1867. Recife: Typographia do Correio do Recife, 1867.).
5 KOLB, Robert. The protection of  the individual in times of  war and 
peace. In: THE OXFORD Handbook of  the History of  International 
Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 317–337. p. 321.
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of  the armed conflict’, a change influenced by the hu-
man rights movement”.6-7 After revisiting such encoun-
ter, we investigate some of  its consequences.
Fundamental norms of  international humanitarian 
law, such as the distinction between combatants and non-
-combatants, the protection of  civilians, the right of  pri-
sioners of  war to a human treatment, the prohibition of  
the use of  biological and chemical weapons, are widely 
accepted. Though such principles are frequently viola-
ted in the battlefield and there is heated disagreement on 
many norms of  humanitarian law instruments, as on tho-
se concerning occupation, 194 states ratified the Geneva 
Conventions of  1949 – one more than the total of  UN 
members – and 172 and 166 states also ratified Proto-
cols I and Additional Protocols II of  1977 Additional to 
the four Geneva Conventions, respectively.8 Some of  the 
most popular human rights instruments, as the 1948 Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime 
of  Genocide, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the 1984 Convention against Tor-
ture, have less acceptance than the ones on humanitarian 
law, with 142, 167 and 153 parties, respectively.9 
Just as human rights, the rules, principles and catego-
ries of  international humanitarian law integrate our ver-
nacular language. Domestic and human rights courts, as 
the U.S. Supreme Court in cases concerning the so-called 
illegal combatants or the Inter-American Court on Hu-
man Rights in the Gomes Lund case, invoke international 
humanitarian norms to decide about sensitive national 
matters. Humanitarian law also is increasingly present in 
broadcasts and printed media, not only in the United Sta-
tes and European countries, but also in Latin American 
ones. Contemporaneously civilians and military targets 
sound so natural to our ears that one loses sight of  how 
recently these terms came to be part of  the language that 
ordinary people use to describe events, to think about 
human affairs and to formulate claims for social change. 
6 MERON, Theodor. The humanization of  international law. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers, 2006
7 It was after the second half  of  the 20th century that the expres-
sion ‘humanitarian law’ began to be used in lieu of  earlier expres-
sions. Such change was “fashionable” in circles around the Red 
Cross, according to Schwarzenberger (SCHWARZENBERGER, 
Georg. From the Laws of  War to the Law of  Armed Conflict. Cur-
rent Legal Problems, v. 21, n. 1, p. 239–258, 1968. p. 250).
8 It is noteworthy that neither US nor Israel are party of  
the 1977 Protocols. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
INTRO?OpenView.  Access in: 2 Jan. 2020.
9 See: http://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en. 
Access in: 2 Jan. 2020.
International humanitarian law definitely became 
popular. Its popularity nonetheless does not assure ei-
ther the accomplishment of  its aims, or greater consen-
sus on the meaning of  its norms. Rather the opposite, 
the more far-reaching the circulation of  humanitarian 
norms is, the more disputed their meaning seems to get. 
The unfolding events of  9/11 have been a milestone in 
the vernacularization of  humanitarian law.10 Based on 
the decision to consider the war against al-Qaeda nei-
ther an international conflict nor a internal conflict and 
to interpret the category ‘non-international conflict’ 
restrictively, the politics of  war of  the United States 
brought to the fore the capacity of  international law to 
cope with current armed conflicts, particularly the ones 
against transnational groups. International humanita-
rian law then became a matter of  concern and public 
debate in local contexts that were crossed by human 
rights, taken not only as juridical norms, but mainly as 
part of  vernacular language, that is, as cultural norms. 
In this article, we intend to shed light on the encoun-
ter of  humanitarian law with human rights, illuminating 
specially its effects on the state power. We argue that the 
emergence of  human rights as a language of  political 
transformation has had a crucial impact on humanitarian 
law. Their rise would have created favorable conditions for 
humanitarian norms to reclaim their place in law and po-
litics, whereas making them more open both to criticisms 
regarding their efficience and to abusive uses by states. 
The article is divided in four parts. After this intro-
duction, the following section discusses how humanita-
rian norms were advanced in the 19th century within a 
formal framework that demanded rigid categories. The 
third section deals with the emergence of  human rights 
vis-à-vis humanitarian law. Finally, the forth part raises 
some consequences of  this process.
2  Drawing humanitarian lines in the 
19th century
In the European nineteenth century, liberal ideas 
traced from the Enlightenment such as order, reason 
and civilisation became desires and arguments alongside 
practices of  Empire and violence elsewhere. European 
10 For a research based on archival work, see: MOYN, Samuel. 
From Antiwar Politics to Antitorture Politics. In: LAW and War. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, p. 154–197.
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jurists nurtured a vague notion of  Rule of  Law, and in-
ternational law was highly regarded as a (political) pro-
ject that could extract legal procedures from politics and 
diplomacy whilst claims to departure from the former 
and absorb the latter. “The fight for an international 
Rule of  Law”, writes Koskenniemi, “is a fight against 
politics, understood as a matter of  furthering subjective 
desires and leading into an international anarchy”.11
Perhaps one of  the best illustrations of  such endea-
vour is the work of  Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808-
1881), a Swiss lawyer and one of  the founders of  the 
organisation that embodied this spirit of  the time, the 
Institut de Droit International. To Bluntschli, international 
law constrained state sovereignty to “maintain peace 
and civilise war” with rules.12 Yet, for it to work, the 
relations between sovereigns had to be orchestrated by 
law rather than politics. For him, relations disciplined 
through legal rules alongside the Rule of  Law in the in-
ternational sphere could result in order and civilisation.
Calls for a codification of  international law circu-
lated amongst jurists such as Bluntschli and others.13 
They seem to share the belief  that ordering internatio-
nal rules regulating state behaviour would favour orde-
ring their life in the international sphere.14-15 If  law was 
going to play a crucial role in restraining and organising 
war, it was essential to pose international legal defini-
11 KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. The politics of  international law. Eu-
ropean Journal of  International Law, v. 1, 1990. p. 5.
12 According to Bluntschli, “un état ne peut pretender qu’à 
l’indépendance et à la liberté compatibles avec l’organisation néces-
saire de l’humanité, avec l’indépendance des autres états et avec les 
liens qui unissent les états entre eux. 1. Le droit international main-
tient et restreint à la fois la souveraineté des états, parce qu’il cherche 
à maintenir la paix et civilise la guerre en la réglementant. Aucun état 
ne peut, contre le droit international, faire appel à sa souveraineté, 
parce que le droit international a pour base, non pas le bon plai-
sir des états, mais les droits et les intérêts généraux de l’humanité.” 
(BLUNTSCHLI, Johann Caspar. Le droit international codifié. Paris: 
Libraire de Guillaumin, 1895, p. 66).
13 On this matter see: KENNEDY, David. International law and 
the nineteenth century: history of  an illusion. Nordic Journal of  Inter-
national Law, v. 65, n. 3, p. 385–420, 1996.
14 The codification initiatives crossed into the 20th century and rep-
resent a powerful positivist approach to international law. Examples 
range from the Bustamante Code (1928) to art. 13(1)(a) of  the UN 
Charter. For a study on an early proposal of  an International Law 
Code from the Brazilian jurist Epitácio Pessoa, see: FRANCA FIL-
HO, Marcílio Toscano; MIALHE, Jorge Luís; JOB, Ulisses Silveira. 
Epitácio pessoa e a codificação do direito internacional. Porto Alegre: Sergio 
Antonio Fabris, 2013.
15 For a comprehensive study on the matter, see: DE VISSCHER, 
Charles. La codification du droit international. Recueil des Cours, v. 6, 
p. 325–472, 1925.
tions and categories such as ‘peace’, ‘conflict’, ‘battle-
field’, ‘civilians’, and ‘combatants’. The jurists in the 
late 19th century agreed on two distinct sets of  ideas: “a 
humanitarian moral conviction that the forces of  pea-
ce stand outside war, demanding that swords be beaten 
into ploughshares, and a legal project to sharpen the 
distinction between public powers and private rights. 
The result was a legal conception of  war as a public 
project ‘limited to its sphere’”.16
Current understandings of  humanitarian law as part 
of  a framework committed to the protection of  the hu-
man person in times of  armed conflict is distant from 
the arguments made at late 19th century conferences 
and documents. Nonetheless, alongside their desire to 
foster an international Rule of  Law, the liberal inter-
national lawyers of  the late 19th century struggled with 
the persistent phenomenon of  war. If  they overwhel-
mingly opposed war “as a manifestation of  the primi-
tive and destructive instincts that it was the point of  
law to eradicate from civilized life”, at the same time, 
“they were equally averse against utopians who failed 
to see that war was occasionally needed to change an 
obsolete situation or was an enforcement against the 
law-breaker”.17 The laws of  war did not operate in spite 
of  such duality, quite the opposite: they rested upon it. 
On the one hand, as civilisation was not evolved enough 
to curtail wars, international lawyers argued, its barba-
rianism at least ought to be fought. International law 
would play a vital role in their attempt to control war, 
even if  it was for a restricted Western group of  nations. 
On the other hand, jurists from the 19th century also 
understood the need to favour military rationale over 
the humanitarian one. The notion of  ‘military necessity’ 
endorsed by the early documents and treaties allowed 
more than they prohibited: the laws of  war equally legi-
timised the belligerent’s violent conduct.18 
The unsettling combination of  humanitarianism 
and militarism is captured in the early international law 
textbooks not only from Europe but also mimicked at 
fringes of  the ius publicum europaeum. The brief  mention 
mention of  Menezes de Drummond’s reading of  the 
16 KENNEDY, David. Of  war and law. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2006. p. 66.
17 KOSKENNIEMI, Martti. The gentle civilizer of  nations: the rise 
and fall of  international law 1870–1960. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001. p. 83.
18 NORMAND, Roger; JOCHNICK, Chris Af. The legitimation 
of  violence: a critical analysis of  the Gulf  war. Harvard Journal of  
International Law, v. 35, n. 1, p. 49–95, 1994.
N
AG
A
M
IN
E
, R
en
at
a; 
RO
RI
Z
, J
oã
o.
 H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s, 
H
um
an
ita
ria
n 
La
w
 a
nd
 S
ta
te
 P
ow
er
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
17
, n
. 1
, p
. 4
17
-4
31
, 2
02
0
422
Paraguayan War in the beginning of  thus article is an 
example. A similar appraisal can be found in other ca-
nonic texts, such as the work of  famous Argentinean 
jurist Carlos Calvo (1824-1906). To him, it is a general 
principle in the laws of  war “that no cultured nation 
should use means or instruments of  war that produce 
a useless effusion of  blood”, what did not mean that 
“modern peoples have to renounce warrior art develo-
pments and the reform of  its armaments, which mar-
ching in consumption with civilisation are under new, 
albeit terrible modifications”.19
The nineteenth century conferences and treaties 
combined humanitarian cries for limits on human su-
ffering and broad permissions for ‘necessary’ military 
action. Both features are present in the 1864 Geneva 
Convention, the 1868 Declaration of  St. Petersburg, the 
Brussels Conference of  1874, the 1880 Oxford Manual 
and The Hague Conventions of  1899. Whether one un-
derstands them as ‘hallmarks’ of  current humanitarian 
law20 or as ‘failures’ and guided by a military logic,21 the-
se instruments aimed at settling clear rules of  engage-
ment. Even if  they left room for the political manoeu-
vres with the notion of  ‘military necessity’, they were 
drafted with a formalistic mindset. When assessing the 
development of  the law throuought the century, a Bra-
zilian jurist of  the 19th century hailed the 1864 Geneva 
Convention: it had “greatly civilised war”.22 Precise and 
straightforward rules were the right direction.
The calls in the second half  of  the 19th century for 
drafting international norms and principles applicable 
during warfare did not mean a displacement of  the state 
either in political and legal theory or in political practi-
19 “como principio general en esta materia puede asentarse el de 
que ninguna nacion culta debe servirse de medios o instrumentos 
de guerra que produzcan una efusion inútil de sangre, sin que eso 
quiera decir, que los pueblos modernos hayan de renunciar a los 
adelantos en el arte guerrero y a la reforma de sus armamentos, que 
marchando de consumo con la civilizacion sufren nuevas, aunque 
terribles modificaciones” (CALVO, Carlos. Derecho Internacional Teóri-
co y Prático de Europa y América. Paris: A. Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 
1868. v. 1. p. 392).
20 KOLB, Robert. The protection of  the individual in times of  war 
and peace. In: THE OXFORD Handbook of  the History of  Inter-
national Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. p. 317–337.
21 NORMAND, Roger; JOCHNICK, Chris Af. The legitimation 
of  violence: a critical analysis of  the Gulf  war. Harvard Journal of  
International Law, v. 35, n. 1, p. 49–95, 1994. p. 66 and 76.
22 “Civilizou-se muito a guerra. A Convenção de Genebra de 1864 
pôs em prática a regra: Hostes, dum vulnerati, fratres” (LESSA, Pe-
dro Augusto Carneiro. O direito no século XIX. Revista da Faculdade 
de Direito de São Paulo, São Paulo, v. 8, p. 161–207, 1900. p. 194)
ces. On the contrary: the idea of  sovereignty remained 
central to the international legal order and to the 19th 
century political kosmos when the early documents brou-
ght into light some of  what the orthodox historiogra-
phy claims to be the fundamental humanitarian norms. 
The spread of  a radical readings of  liberal ideas faced 
resistance from those who opposed any attempts to lo-
cate the esprit d’internationalité outside the state. It was a 
common opinion among jurists that the competencies 
of  the sovereign derived from the sovereign itself, not 
from an exogenous morality or any other political au-
thority.23 The sovereignty of  a nation is “nothing but 
its own will”, wrote the Brazilian jurist Lafayette Ro-
drigues Pereira (1834-1917), to whom international law 
was the result of  the common will of  nations.24 Amidst 
competencies of  the sovereign were the police power 
at the domestic level and the warfare at the internatio-
nal one. The legal regulation of  war (a long step away 
from the previous Clausewitzian tradition of  war and 
politics) defined the boundaries of  action of  the states 
against each other based on what was prohibited (hen-
ce, also what was permissible), but it also strengthened 
their authority towards their citizens and non-citizens 
in their territories once international law described one 
sole legitimate way of  combating: as a state. Besides, the 
sovereign remained the only one who could create and 
chose to be bound by such rules. “From the notion of  
war”, Rodrigues Pereira wrote, “one clearly infers that 
the only one who has the capacity to make it are sove-
reign and independent nations, who are the subjects of  
international law”.25
Despite the efforts for a general law of  armed con-
flict framework, the architects of  the post world wars 
in the 20th century surrounded international law with 
disbelief, especially regarding its ability to regulate po-
litical and military power while claiming to be outside 
politics.26 This disbelief  would have been stronger after 
23 This doctrine was very much influenced by the German tradi-
tion of  international legal thinking, especially from 1871 to 1933. 
On this matter, see chapter 3 of  Martti Koskenniemi’s Gentle Civi-
lizer. 
24 “A soberania da nação não é senão a sua propria vontade”. 
(PEREIRA, Lafayette Rodrigues. Princípios de direito internacional. Rio 
de Janeiro: Jacintho Ribeiro dos Santos, 1903. t. 1. p. 24)
25 “Da noção de guerra deprehende-se claramente que só tem ca-
pacidade para faze-la as nações soberanas e independentes – as que 
são pessoas do Direito Internacional”. (PEREIRA, Lafayette Rodri-
gues. Princípios de direito internacional. Rio de Janeiro: Jacintho Ribeiro 
dos Santos, 1903. t. 2. p. 62).
26 Classic examples are E. H. Carr’s The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939) 
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the Second World War. If  the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact 
outlawing war still can be seen as a demonstration of  
faith in international law, in the aftermath of  the Second 
World War jurists found themselves in the delicate posi-
tion of  having to persuade world leaders and diplomats 
of  the importance of  international law and to provide a 
formal regulation to the world. 
Because of  such general disbelief, jurists devoted 
their energy, talents and knowledge to find a role for the 
law in the new order, instead of  insisting on styling an 
organisation to control power through rules. One pos-
sibility was conferring a stronger role to judicial institu-
tions, as advocated (albeit differently) by Hersch Lau-
terpacht (1897-1960) in the 1930s27 and Hans Kelsen 
(1881-1973) in the 1940s.28 The focus on the intrinsic 
value of  legal norms shifted to its use, whereas effec-
tiveness and, later, persuasiveness replaced validity as a 
criterion for legality.29 One effect of  such change has 
been that conventional lines separating law, morality, 
and politics that the 20th century inherited from the late 
19th became gradually blurred in legal reasoning. The 
indeterminacy of  such spheres created conditions for 
the moralization of  international politics, the legaliza-
tion of  morals at the international level, and the politi-
cization of  international law.
The shift to the use of  international law, instead of  
focusing the value of  its norms, or, in other words, the 
shift from a formalistic mindset to an instrumentalist 
one, profundly affected international humanitarian law. 
Throughout the second half  of  the 20th century, milita-
ry personnel took active part in the negotiations of  in-
ternational humanitarian instruments under the pretext 
that this could facilitate its compliance. Indeed, as we 
learned from the U.S. war against terrorism,30 military 
personnel can hold stronger commitments to the laws 
of  war than civil public servants for humanitarian or 
and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1946).
27 LAUTERPACHT, Hersch. The function of  law in the international 
community. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
28 KELSEN, Hans. Peace through law. New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd., 2000.
29 According to Kennedy, to think that a certain norm is ‘valid’ is 
to consider that it was promulgated by the proper institution and the 
correct procedure or if  it can be deduced by legitimate means and 
interpreters. KENNEDY, David. Of  war and law. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2006. 91-92
30 NAGAMINE, Renata Reverendo Vidal Kawano; RORIZ, João 
Henrique Ribeiro. O combatente inimigo no debate sobre a con-
dução da guerra dos Estados Unidos contra o terrorismo. Revista 
brasileira de ciências criminais, n. 120, p. 329–377, 2016.
utilitarian reasons, but bringing them to the negotiation 
table resulted in international legal norms less ambi-
tious than humanitarian advocates expected. These ad-
vocates supported such agreements, and began to invest 
their energies and resources to expand the constraints 
on the use of  force beyond what was agreed upon on 
treaties. Their strategy has been portraying international 
norms in a more persuasive way in the public debate, 
which often means invoking moral arguments to sup-
port readings of  international norms more conforming 
to the grammar of  the public arena. As legal scholar 
David Kennedy argues, the clear and straightforward 
rules drafted throughout the 19th century thus become 
principles and customs, or general patterns whose en-
forcement depends on the circumstances, i.e., on poli-
tics. In such public battle to define the boundaries of  
international legal categories, the military responds to 
the moral argument sponsored by humanitarians with 
national interest rhetoric.31 During the cold war, natio-
nal security and, consequently, military necessity argu-
ments were widely acceptable in international relations 
and in national societies, but their acceptance begins to 
wane as human rights rise and create conditions for the 
emergence of  humanitarian law.
3  Humanitarian law meets human 
rights
The rise of  human rights has been seen as a rema-
rkable feature of  the 20th century, and intellectuals from 
different fields have dedicated efforts to its study from 
diverse perspectives. The emergence of  a strong rights 
language among 20th century utopias has been timely 
pointed by Claude Lefort in his 1979 essay Droits de 
l’homme et politique and studied by the Brazilian sociolo-
gist Luciano Oliveira in his doctoral thesis developed 
under Lefort supervision at the École des Hautes Étu-
des. Good examples from the legal field are texts from 
Hersch Lauterpacht (e.g., International Law and Human 
Rights, 1950) and Louis Henkin (e.g., The Rights Of  Man 
Today, 1978). From the International Relations field, 
the phenomenon has been researched mainly from the 
constructivist perspective, such as the work from Mar-
garet Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (e.g., Activists beyond 
31 KENNEDY, David. Of  war and law. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2006. p. 84-88.
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Borders, 1998) and Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and 
Sikkink (e.g., The Power of  Human Rights, 1999). More 
recently, it has been analysed by the intellectual historian 
Samuel Moyn in his provocative The Last Utopia. 
Understanding human rights as a frame to social 
mobilisation, Moyn claims that the rise of  human ri-
ghts has been possible due to the disbelief  in compe-
ting utopias, particularly, socialism, anticolonialism, and 
nationalism in the late 1960s and 1970s. Leftist activists 
and social movements in Eastern Europe were discou-
raged to reform their regimes, whereas the ones in Latin 
America were unsuccessful in leading revolutions. The 
upsurge of  internal conflicts and authoritarian regimes 
in decolonised territories in turn discredited the state 
as the sole incubator of  rights. Moyn argues that in the 
second half  of  the 1960s disappointment stroke poli-
tics in general and created conditions for the abstract 
norms of  human rights to emerge as a moral and an 
anti-politics frame, vehicles of  moral progress. This 
new understanding and use of  rights did not sit easy 
with traditional international law, and its sovereignist 
core. A number of  jurists such as Henkin in the US 
(and we could add Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade 
and Carlos Nino in Brazil and Argentina, respectively) 
advocated for a turn in the discipline, one that would 
leave its statist focus behind.
Human rights then met international law and, for 
Moyn, the former vested the later with a once lost au-
thority that was responsible for its resurgence in the 
20th century.32 To the historian, “peripheral before as a 
widespread framework for improvement, international 
law is perhaps the prime beneficiary of  the recent cri-
sis and recasting of  utopian aspirations”.33 Throughout 
the 1970s and part of  the 1980s, human rights were 
anti-totalitarian and committed to the protection of  the 
individual against the state, features now commonly at-
tributed to be the “purpose” or “function” of  interna-
32 Martti Koskenniemi (The Gentle Civilizer of  Nations, 2001) and 
Samuel Moyn (The Last Utopia, 2010) read differently the political 
projects of  international law in the second half  of  the 20th century. 
While the Finnish lawyer believes that international law as a lan-
guage capable of  making sense of  the world declined around the 
1960s, the American historian understands that it rose again dur-
ing the 1970s, with human rights at its core. For more on this, see: 
RORIZ, João. Direitos Humanos como um novo projeto para o di-
reito internacional: notas sobre the Last Utopia, de Samuel Moyn. 
Brazilian Journal of  International Law, v. 15, n. 2, p. 490–496, 2018.
33 MOYN, Samuel. The last utopia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2010, p. 176.
tional law itself.34 
Similarly, humanitarian law did not thrive at once. 
The brief  momentum of  enthusiasm with it after the 
Second World War that culminated in the draft of  the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, dwindled in the anxieties of  
the cold war and the imminent possibility of  the ou-
tbreak of  a nuclear war. In the face of  nuclear threat 
and the wars of  national liberation turned into proxy 
wars by Great Powers, anti-war politics marked the late 
1960s and early 1970s. During this period, and despite 
the Vietnam War, the idea of  addressing atrocity did not 
become a central issue to pacifism, nor inspired a mo-
vement to discuss it.35 Even amongst jurists the struggle 
remained more about ending wars and fostering peace 
than making them less ‘barbaric’. 
Jus in bello and jus ad bellum were turned into strange 
bedfellows in the post-Second World War order. The 
UN Charter prohibited the use of  force in international 
relations if  not in self-defense or authorized by the Se-
curity Council, but no words were dedicated to the con-
duct of  hostilities. Unlike human rights, humanitarian 
law was not mentioned in the Charter and remained a 
separated issue discussed in different diplomatic meetin-
gs. whereas humanitarian law regulated the use of  force, 
determing how and when it could be used according 
to international law. International human rights law ins-
truments, in tandem with legal and political institutions 
dedicated to their implementation, and the challenges 
brought by the anti-colonial wars, account for changes 
in its corpus juris. Some initiatives could be numbered. 
One could mention among them the regulation of  non-
-international conflicts by commom article 3, the 1968 
Teheran Resolution prescribing human rights norms to 
be applied in armed conflicts and the agreement on the 
understanding that national liberation wars should be 
considered international conflicts. Nevertheless, none 
of  those reasons can explain how humanitarian norms 
came to be part of  our vernacular language. 
We understand that the novel human rights appeal 
to mobilise social movements to political action made 
the detachment of  activists from pacifism possible by 
definitely changing the law to which individuals owed 
34 MOYN, Samuel. From Antiwar Politics to Antitorture Poli-
tics. In: LAW and War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 
p. 154–197.
35 I MOYN, Samuel. From Antiwar Politics to Antitorture Poli-
tics. In: LAW and War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 
p. 154–197.
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obedience.36 Human rights as advocated from the li-
beral perspective from the 1970s onwards empowered 
the individual against the state and since it promoted 
the international sphere it also displaced the state as a 
preferential reference to utopian claims. Pacifists that 
could not efficaciously pressure states to respect the 
UN Charter soon began to turn to human rights in 
order to circumscribe their freedom to choose means 
and methods of  combat. The conduct of  armed con-
flicts becomes a primary concern for them once they 
realise how useless it had been to mobilise against their 
outbreak.37 Thus, humanitarian law came to be part of  
the civil lexicon human rights activists would have to 
be liberated from concerns with anti-totalitarianism and 
pacifists from both the imminence of  a nuclear war and 
from the faith that social action can prevent states to 
recourse to armed force. Along this line of  thought, the 
entanglement of  human rights and humanitarian law to 
political purposes results from a political process that 
outdates the formal convergence between them. 
A number of  factors might have contributed more 
directly for the vernacularizaton of  international huma-
nitarian law. One example is the processes of  transitio-
nal justice in Latin America due to the fact that activists 
began to claim for accountability for acts of  torture 
and to frame their demands as crimes against humanity. 
Another is its use by activists and other political actors 
in the United States to overcome the suspicion that then 
president Ronald Reagan nurtured with regards to hu-
man rights. A decisive step was the institution of  the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugos-
lavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) by the Security 
Council in the first half  of  the 1990s. One of  the best 
examples is the early ICTY jurisprudence, specially the 
Tadic case.38 The ascendancy of  humanitarian law as a 
vernacular language used in political struggle to claim 
for social change therefore would result from its reading 
according to the human rights grammar and as part of  
the human rights morality. 
36 SHKLAR, Judith N. Legalism: law, morals, and political trials. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.
37 MOYN, Samuel. From Antiwar Politics to Antitorture Poli-
tics. In: LAW and War. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014, 
p. 154–197.
38 NAGAMINE, Renata R. V. K. O Tribunal para a antiga Iu-
goslávia na formação da norma da responsabilidade individual 
por graves violações de direitos humanos: tensões entre direitos 
humanos e princípios penais liberais. Espaço Jurídico Journal of  Law, 
v. 17, n. 3, p. 779–796, 2016.
It is interesting to recall that in his The Last Utopia, 
Moyn argues that, throughout the decades, human ri-
ghts had turned from a minimalist, anti-totalitarian fra-
me into a maximalist one; and indeed, if  we analyse the 
1993 Vienna Conference, we can note that human rights 
has been associated with different projects, from civil 
and family rights to development issues. One can add 
to Moyn’s argument that, in the process of  becoming a 
maximalist frame, human rights also became more con-
tested and less universal. Their rise as a utopia thereby 
inaugurated its waning as a universal pattern, culmina-
ting in their emergence as relative norms in the 1990s. 
Not only political scientists and philosophers now en-
gage in public debate on the universality or relativity of  
human rights – and one sees renewed theoretical efforts 
to construe the universality of  their fundamentals –, but 
also some international norms are proposed, as huma-
nitarian intervention and late in the decade the notion 
of  ‘responsibility to protect’.39
As humanitarian law becomes part of  the curren-
tly available talk about human affairs, it begins to be 
used to describe social phenomena in wider and more 
different political arenas. This means, inter alia, that hu-
manitarian norms begin to be applied in local contexts 
and hence be appropriated by local actors. To use inter-
national norms for social mobilization in local contexts 
human rights and humanitarian activists not only apply, 
but also interpret them. In other words, they also create 
meaning, they signify them. 
4  From limits to authorization?: state 
action in legal indeterminacy
In this section, we argue that in situations in which 
the set of  applicable norms is unclear and there is a lar-
ger room for legal indeterminacy, legal definitions beco-
me blurred and this gives room for abuse. Notably, we 
understand that international human rights law may in 
some cases enable the state to use its sovereign powers 
with minimal constraints in the suppression of  political 
opposition and that humanitarian norms are relegated 
in such process.
The entanglement between humanitarian law and 
39 ORFORD, Anne. International authority and the responsibility to pro-
tect. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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human rights became evident when specific cases were 
dealt with, and a need for coherence in legal argumen-
tation was deemed crucial. In the 1996 Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion, the International Court of  Justice 
provided some unity between the two set of  laws. To 
the judges in The Hague who were involved with the 
case human rights law could also be applicable during 
armed conflicts and humanitarian law could be inter-
preted as its lex specialis,40 what generated some continui-
ty between their norms. This reading has been restated 
in other cases.41-42 To one commentator it was just after 
the advisory opinion that scholars broadly used the La-
tin expression to describe the relationship between the 
two set of  laws, what suggests that such understanding 
of  consistency is quite recent.43
One could hence assume that the linearity between 
them would mean that humanitarian norms should 
apply in situations when human rights are legally sus-
pended. Nevertheless, there has been much room for 
debate.
Most human rights instruments provide space for 
exceptional situations, when certain rights can be sus-
pended. According to article 4 of  the International Co-
venant on Civil and Political Rights states parties must 
not endanger the lives of  individuals nor subject them 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.44 
40 “In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of  one’s life 
applies also in hostilities. The test of  what is an arbitrary deprivation 
of  life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex spe-
cialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed 
to regulate the conduct of  hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss 
of  life, through the use of  a certain weapon in warfare, is to be 
considered an arbitrary deprivation of  life contrary to Article 6 of  
the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable 
in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of  the Covenant 
itself ” (ICJ, Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons (Ad-
visory Opinion)., p. 25)
41 ICJ, Legal Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion).
42 ICJ, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of  the 
Congo (DRC v. Uganda).
43 MILANOVIC, Marko. The Lost Origins of  Lex Specialis. In: 
THEORETICAL Boundaries of  Armed Conflict and Human 
Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 78–117.
44 “Article 4. (1) In time of  public emergency which threatens the 
life of  the nation and the existence of  which is officially proclaimed, 
the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures der-
ogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of  the situation, provided 
that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on 
the ground of  race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
(2) No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 
The European45 and American46 human rights con-
ventions have similar provisions, and the prohibition 
of  torture is deemed absolute under the Convention 
against Torture of  1984.47 Human rights courts and 
institutions have addressed the issue. When assessing 
the applicability of  habeas corpus in emergencies, the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights understood 
that the obligation of  states to recognise and respect 
rights and freedoms implies that they have the obliga-
tion to protect and ensure its exercise with guarantees 
to make them effective in all circumstances. According 
to the Court, the obligations to respect life and integri-
ty, to prevent disappearances, and protect the individual 
against torture compel states to preserve the instrument 
16 and 18 may be made under this provision. (…)”(UNITED NA-
TIONS. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Disponível 
em: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/pages/home.aspx. Acesso em: 
4 jan. 2020.)
45 “Article 15. Derogation in time of  emergency. (1) In time of  
war or other public emergency threatening the life of  the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obli-
gations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of  the situation, provided that such measures are not in-
consistent with its other obligations under international law. (2) No 
derogation from Article 2, except in respect of  deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of  war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be 
made under this provision”(COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Convention 
for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Disponível 
em: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020).
46 “Article 27. Suspension of  Guarantees (1) In time of  war, pub-
lic danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or 
security of  a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its 
obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the 
period of  time strictly required by the exigencies of  the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obli-
gations under international law and do not involve discrimination on 
the ground of  race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. (2). 
The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of  the 
following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 
4 (Right to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 
6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto 
Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of  Conscience and Religion), Article 
17 (Rights of  the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article 19 
(Rights of  the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 
23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of  the judicial guar-
antees essential for the protection of  such rights.” (ORGANIZA-
TION OF AMERICAN STATES. American Convention of  Human 
Rights. Disponível em: https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/
basic3.american%20convention.ht. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.)
47 “Article 2 (2). No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of  war or a threat of  war, internal political instability 
or any other public emergency, may be invokd as a justification of  
torture.” (UNITED NATIONS. Convention against torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Disponível em: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx. 
Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020
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of  the habeas corpus even when there is a suspension 
of  guarantees.48 When facing a similar question, the Eu-
ropean Court of  Human Rights created some proce-
dural guidelines to address it. The court distinguished 
threats to “life of  the nation”, from those that threatens 
“public order”, and sets limits to the advancement of  
state power on the human rights. The danger that threa-
tens the life of  the nation also allows derogation of  the 
most fundamental rights, while the danger threatening 
public order would open exhaustively listed exceptions 
(articles 2 and 5 of  European Convention) and restric-
tions (articles 8 to 11). Most importantly, the Court 
would control the respect to the legal framework as a 
whole and the proportionality of  State measures, dis-
tinguishing measures as (i) timely or reasonable (art. 5), 
(ii) absolutely necessary (art. 2 (2)), (iii) strictly necessary 
(art. 6 (1)), and the (iv) strictly necessary measure requi-
red by the situation (art. 15).49 At the UN level, the Ge-
neral Comment N. 29 (2001) (that replaced the General 
Comment N. 5 from 1981), states that the maintenance 
of  procedural guarantees is inherent to the protection 
of  non-derogable rights, and that the protection against 
arbitrary detention incidentally also protects against ill-
-treatment, inhuman treatment and torture. The Com-
ment also considers that the peremptory human rights 
norms extend beyond the provisions enroled in Article 
4 (2) of  the 1966 Pact. States cannot, according to it, 
rely on their laws to justify an act that violates interna-
tional humanitarian law or jus cogens, such as arbitrary 
detention and deviations from the fundamental princi-
ples of  a fair trial.50
Such understandings pose limits to states but at the 
same time give them space for manoeuvre in other cir-
cumstances in accordance with human rights norms 
and not necessarily covered by humanitarian law. When 
balancing more flexible norms and principles other con-
siderations (such as security) may play a role. Detention 
has been an example, especially after 9/11. When dea-
ling with it, the European Court understood that to be 
48 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. El 
habeas corpus bajo suspensión de garantías (Opinión Consultiva OC-8/87). 
Disponível em: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/se-
riea_08_esp.pdf. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020. p. 35.
49 DELMAS-MARTY, Mireille. Libertés et sûreté dans un monde dan-
gereux. Paris: Le Seuil, 2010. p. 158-159.
50 UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE. CCPR General Comment 
No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of  Emergency (CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.11). Disponível em: https://www.refworld.org/
docid/453883fd1f.html. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.
legal, detention ought to be in agreement with domestic 
legislation and cannot be contrary to the Convention. 
Detention must be linked to the reasonings put for-
ward by the government, must offer means so that the 
defendant can contest it, must be implemented under 
appropriate conditions, and with a duration that does 
not exceed its purpose.51 Nonetheless, despite its conti-
nued effort to delineate notions and set parameters, the 
European Court already broadened its understanding in 
cases involving terrorism: 
46. The Court has found in previous cases 
that detention on remand exceeding five years 
constituted a violation of  Article 5 § 3 of  the 
Convention [references omitted].
47. The present case involved a particularly complex 
investigation and trial concerning serious offences 
of  international terrorism which caused the death 
of  three victims and serious suffering to more than 
a hundred. Following his extradition from Lebanon 
in 1996, the sole reason for the applicant’s presence 
in Germany was to stand trial for these offences.
48. In these exceptional circumstances, the Court 
concludes that the length of  the applicant’s 
detention can still be regarded as reasonable. There 
has accordingly been no violation of  Article 5 § 3 
of  the Convention.52
Another example concerns definitions. When dea-
ling with actual cases, the blind spots can mean space 
for bending norms and advancing other agendas. The 
boundaries between inhuman treatment and torture, for 
example, are quite blurred. International human rights 
law delineates what torture is, but does not present a 
definition of  inhumane treatment. And the unclear li-
mits between them has the practical effect of  stressing 
a greater stigma on torture; after all the Convention de-
mands States to criminalise only it53 – leaving inhumane 
treatment aside. The European Court has decided that 
whereas the prohibition of  ill-treatment is absolute, this 
does not mean that any sort of  ill-treatment will be se-
vere enough to prevent extradition or deportation as an 
51 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. A and Others 
v. The United Kingdom. Disponível em: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-91403. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020. p. 184.
52 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Chradi v. Ger-
many. Disponível em: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-77694. 
Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.
53 “Article 4 (1) Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of  tor-
ture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to 
an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which 
constitutes complicity or participation in torture.” (UNITED NA-
TIONS. Convention against torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. Disponível em: https://www.ohchr.org/en/
professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.)
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inhumane treatment.54-55 In light of  such understanding, 
the Court understood that the European Convention 
should not be a means by which its state parties im-
pose conventional standards to non-state parties, and 
ultimately recognises that it will rarely conclude for the 
impossibility to extradite or deport to a state with de-
mocratic, human rights, and rule of  law traditions. To 
complicate things further, the very existence of  those 
limits in humanitarian law would be uncertain, given 
that its framework does not define inhuman treatment 
or torture and does not offer criteria to establish levels 
of  gravity among prohibited practices.
In another case and court, judges decided to use the 
human rights reasoning to introduce a definition of  tor-
ture in the field of  humanitarian law. They used the 1984 
Convention definition on torture when applying huma-
nitarian norms – even though the convention itself  es-
tablishes that it does not have extraconventional reach. 
The judges at the International Criminal Court for the 
former Yugoslavia understood in the Kunarac case that 
the prohibition on torture is customary and peremptory 
for criminal liability purposes, even if  its definition is 
not. This opened space for international criminal courts 
to propose a definition of  torture more alligned with 
humanitarian law. With a human rights customary law 
inference, the ICTY judges expanded the notion of  
torture given by human rights instruments: the “offi-
cial capacity” requirement of  the agent56 was dropped.57 
54 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. A and Others 
v. The United Kingdom. Disponível em: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-91403. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020. p. 126-127.
55 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. Babar Ahmad 
and Others v. The United Kingdom. Disponível em: http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-110267. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020. p. 200-201.
56 The definition of  torture present in the 1984 Convention re-
quires a link with the state: “when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of  or with the consent or acquiescence of  a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” (emphasis added) 
(Article 1, UNITED NATIONS. Convention against torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Disponível em: 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cat.aspx. 
Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.)
57 “The Trial Chamber concludes that the definition of  torture 
under international humanitarian law does not comprise the same 
elements as the definition of  torture generally applied under hu-
man rights law. In particular, the Trial Chamber is of  the view that 
the presence of  a state official or of  any other authority-wielding 
person in the torture process is not necessary for the offence to 
be regarded as torture under international humanitarian law.”( IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, “Judge-
ment”, IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T. Disponível em: https://www.
icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf. Acesso em: 
Such decision supposedly had a “more protective” de-
finition58 – more protective for the humanity, remains 
implicit, to the detriment of  the defendant, who would 
benefit from the narrower definition.
This understanding of  torture in international crimi-
nal courts, built in the jurisprudence from the pre-9/11 
scenario, reveals a tension between the liberal criminal law 
tradition and the human rights influence on international 
criminal law with potential implications for the conse-
quences for those accused of  terrorism. In an article pu-
blished before 9/11, a commentator criticises the impre-
cise norms and the restrictions of  rights of  defendants on 
ad hoc criminal courts compared to those granted to them 
domestically. According to him, the imprecision and res-
triction would affect the modalities of  guilt and the pro-
duction of  evidence.59 To another academic and former 
advisor to the ICC Prosecutor, the continuity between 
humanitarian law, human rights law, and international cri-
minal law, as used by international criminal courts, could 
result in the removal of  fundamental rights of  the defen-
dants, which are granted internally. This process could fa-
cilitate, for example, collective criminal responsibilization 
at the cost of  individual procedural guarantees. Also, it 
could lead to the conclusion that whereas the defense of  
society by the state has limits, the defense of  “humanity” 
has not.60 There is little (legal) sense and high margin for 
abuse in defending criminal guarantees and rights when it 
comes to advocate rights against the state and dropping 
them when international trial is in place.
The predisposition of  states to frame dissidents and 
social movements as threats could be eased by such fra-
4 jan. 2020.) For a different approach see: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzi-
ja (1998) ICTY IT-95-17/1-T, [151-153] [160-162].
58 The ICTY judges understood that some elements represented 
customary law and with their reasoning they presented a definition 
of  torture in the field of  humanitarian law (para. 483).  In their words: 
“On the basis of  what has been said, the Trial Chamber holds that, 
in the field of  international humanitarian law, the elements of  the 
offence of  torture, under customary international law are as follows: 
(i) The infliction, by act or omission, of  severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental. (ii) The act or omission must be inten-
tional. (iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information 
or a confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim 
or a third person, or at discriminating, on any ground, against the 
victim or a third person. (references omitted) (Ibid.).
59 SCHABAS, William A. Sentencing by international tribunals: a 
human rights approach. Duke Journal of  Comparative & International 
Law, v. 7, p. 461–517, 1997.
60 ROBINSON, Darryl. The identity crisis of  international crimi-
nal law. Leiden Journal of  International Law, v. 21, n. 4, p. 925–963, 
2008.
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mework, especially in times of  a global “war on terror”. 
Writing about the situation in India one month after 
9/11, the activist Arundhati Roy warned that “gover-
nments across the world are cynically using the prevai-
ling paranoia to promote their own interests” and that 
“all kinds of  unpredictable political forces are being 
unleashed”. She then describes how members of  the 
All India People’s Resistance Forum were jailed while 
distributing anti-war and anti-US pamphlets in Delhi, 
together with the printer of  the leaflets.61 International 
law (including humanitarian and human rights) offers 
mixed possibilities for situations like these. The same 
treaties that could be instrumentalized to uphold po-
litical and civil liberties can also be used to advance 
‘expectional’ measures by the state in times of  trouble. 
After 9/11, the expansion of  criminal categories such 
as “terrorism” and other crimes supposedly against “na-
tional security” came at the cost of  rights like freedom 
of  association and expression, sometimes even without 
the necessary change of  the provisions – just with diffe-
rent interpretations.62 Based on expanded limits, it was 
possible to establish “special procedures” to investigate 
and prosecute without new crimes.63
61 ROY, Arundhati. “Brutality smeared in peanut butter”. 
The Guardian, 2001. Disponível em: https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism8. Acesso em: 
4 jan. 2020.
62 In a report from 2012, Human Rights Watch states that after 
9/11 more than 140 governments have passed counterterrorism 
legislation as a response to a (possible) threat to the country, out 
of  pressure from the USA or as a response to the Security Coun-
cil resolutions after the attacks in New York and Washington. Such 
legislation also made it possible for states to have the legal tools to 
act against different social groups that include non-violence student 
organizations in India and in Turkey, journalists in Ethiopia, and 
ethinic minorities in the UK, among others (HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH. In the name of  security: Counterterrorism laws worldwide 
since September 11. New York: HRW, 2012. Disponível em: htt-
ps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/global0612ForUp-
loadFinal.pdf. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.)
63 Another example would be UN Security Council resolution 
1373, just after 9/11. It decided that all states shall “criminalize the 
wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, 
of  funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention 
that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are 
to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts” and that anybody 
“who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpe-
tration of  terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought 
to justice”. Additionally that “such terrorist acts are established as 
serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that 
the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of  such terrorist acts.” 
This ‘legislative’ action by the Council demanded that all UN party-
states must criminalize the finance of  terrorism. As there is no con-
sensual definition of  terrorism in international instruments, it is up 
to the states to define the crime and to resort to its punitive power. 
5 Final remarks
In this article, we analyse a certain encounter be-
tween human rights and humanitarian law. The novel 
interpretation of  rights that arose in the 1970s with a 
particular frame largely influenced the laws of  war in 
different directions. Distinct political actors began to 
use the legal vocabulary to organize social experience, 
to frame social problems, and to attribute responsibility. 
By interpreting such norms, those political actors lend 
them meanings that might compete against the ones 
produced in national and international institutions, whi-
ch in matters of  war and peace tend to interpret them 
more restrictively due to the interests of  the states and, 
in the case of  international institutions, to the balance 
that they must find in order not to jeopardise their au-
thority. In a scenario of  dissolving legal boundaries and 
fierce disputes of  meaning, the encounter of  human 
rights and humanitarian law also meant a revision of  
some of  the traditional categories of  the latter. The clear 
lines of  humanitarian norms shouldered with abstract 
principles usage in real-life situations. The distinctions 
between categories such as war and peace, internatio-
nal and non-international conflict, civilian and military 
targets, combatants and non-combatants waned, giving 
more flexibility to decision makers and less protection 
to the most vulnerable.
The rise of  human rights as a powerful normative 
language in international relations had significant impli-
cations for the ways in which law and politics are argued 
in this realm. As we tried to show with the encounter 
between human rights and humanitarian law, some of  
the broad and indeterminate features of  rights princi-
ples and provisions might mean more room for abuse. 
The context in which states acts to address issues like 
terrorism and other perceived threats is rather complex. 
Some of  its features include the increasing universali-
ty of  human rights, and on a lesser scale, humanitarian 
law, as political languages as well as a persistent dis-
pute around its meanings and categories. The alleged 
consensus around the necessity of  a jus puniendi and 
the enforcement of  normative categories involves the 
performance of  not only international organisations 
related to criminal justice but also states. The particu-
lar language of  rights might offer states a (normative) 
(UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. Resolution 1373 (S/
RES/1373). Disponível em: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
terrorism/res_1373_english.pdf. Acesso em: 4 jan. 2020.)
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authority from the international level and, at the same 
time, empowers them with the requirement/liberty to 
incorporate such language shouldered with others such 
as national security.
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